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The present research examined how other people’s evaluations towards social groups 
will develop and how these evaluations will affect discriminatory behaviour outside of 
conscious effort. By living in a society people are exposed to other people’s preferences or 
beliefs and these culturally shared preferences or beliefs can become automatic over time. I 
call this construct implicit normative evaluations. In the first series of studies I developed 
and validated implicit normative evaluations measures. Study 2 demonstrated that implicit 
normative evaluations would develop by exposure to cultural norms. Study 3 showed that 
those who were exposed to an audience who laughed at offensive racist jokes were more 
likely to have negative implicit normative evaluation towards a target group and were more 
likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour than those who were exposed to an audience 
who did not laugh at the racist jokes. Finally in Study 4, I examined the consequences of 
implicit normative evaluations towards Black people and found that implicit normative 
evaluations played a role in the shooter bias. The implications of implicit normative 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
One of the older boys remarked about a schoolmate, “Don’t you know that Harry is a Jew?” I 
had never met a Jewish boy before, and personally didn’t care whether or not Harry—who 
seemed a likeable fellow—was a Jew. But the older boy’s tone of voice was enough to convince 
me that I had better not make Harry my friend. Thereafter I avoided Harry. And, although I 
could not understand why we should dislike Jews, I gradually accepted the prejudice. It seems 
strange that a feeling of antagonism toward Harry should grow up on me. But it did.  
 
—Allport, 1954 (p. 287) 
 
Allport (1954) observed that one’s evaluations towards social groups are influenced by the 
subtle ways that other people treat and depict members of these groups. How are such normative 
evaluations different from attitudes? How do such subtle normative evaluations affect cognition 
and behaviour? What are the consequences of these norms? These are the fundamental questions 
I will seek to answer in this dissertation, but first why do we care about how others treat and 
depict members of social groups? 
As human beings, we have two fundamental tasks. First, we need to understand what the 
world is like and how things work in order to effectively engage our environment. Based on their 
experience people will evaluate objects or social groups and decide whether they should 
approach or avoid the objects or social groups. In other words, people form attitudes in the 
process of exploring and learning about the world, and these attitudes will guide future 
behaviour. In this way, people will form preferences, beliefs or behaviour and figure out how the 
environment that surrounds them relates to the self. 
Yet we also need to belong to social groups because human beings are social in nature. 
People are happier and healthier when they are connected to other people and are a part of 
groups (Cohen, 2004). To be included as a part of a group, we need to understand other people’s 
beliefs and preferences (Miller & Anderson, 1979; Schachter, 1951; Williams, 1997, 2001). For 
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example, Sherif (1935) demonstrated that people’s estimation of the distance of the movement of 
a light was influenced by other people’s estimations. People tend to conform to such norms in 
order to increase a chance of acceptance and avoid social rejection. They also seek information 
on appropriate behaviour by observing other people’s beliefs and behaviours so that they can fit 
in with others (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  
Social psychologists have made the distinction between these two tasks using various 
terminologies such as agency vs. communion (Helgeson, 1994); need for cognition (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982) vs. need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995); individual self vs. collective self 
(Turner et al.,1987); assimilation vs. differentiation (Brewer, 1991; Turner et al.,1987).  
I argue that this distinction between individual preferences and group preference also affects 
processing at the implicit level. Research on automaticity has suggested when attitude objects are 
paired with one’s evaluations, over time people develop associations between these two 
constructs. These attitudes can be activated outside of awareness and guide behaviour (Bargh et 
al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986). In fact, research has shown that implicit attitudes reflect well-
practiced associations. For example, early life experience with smoking and body weight 
predicted implicit attitudes towards these constructs whereas recent experience predicted explicit 
attitudes (Rudman, Phelan & Heppen, 2007). I argue that in a similar way that when attitude 
objects (including social groups) are repeatedly paired with other people’s preferences or 
evaluations, over time people develop associations between these constructs. In this way, the 
association between attitude objects and other people’s preferences or evaluations can be 





Implicit Normative Evaluations 
Although to my knowledge no studies have yet examined implicit normative evaluations, 
some evidence consistent with my reasoning can be found in the literature. For example, people 
can adjust their own behaviour to stay in line with others without conscious efforts (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). Specifically, when a confederate mimics a participant’s behaviour (e.g., shaking a 
foot or rubbing a face), the participant felt closer to the confederate. However, the debriefing 
session revealed that participants were not aware of the confederate’s behaviour, suggesting that 
social influences can occur outside of awareness. More direct evidence of how exposure to the 
environment will shape implicit normative evaluations can be found in a longitudinal study 
conducted by Dasgupta and Asgari (2004). They found that over time female students who were 
exposed to counter-stereotypical professors had significantly more positive automatic stereotypes 
about women. Although the researchers did not assess implicit normative evaluations directly, 
implicit stereotypes may reflect shared beliefs about women (i.e., most people value women). 
Through repeated exposure to the leadership roles that female professors play, female students in 
the women’s college may develop positively shared beliefs about women outside of awareness. 
Distinction between Implicit Attitudes vs. Implicit Normative Evaluations 
I argue not only that implicit normative evaluations are important constructs, but also that 
they are distinct from implicit attitudes. People are knowledgeable of the culturally shared beliefs 
even if their attitudes are not consistent with normative evaluations. For example, in our society 
milk is considered healthy and important for nutrition and bone growth. By being exposed to the 
societal views towards milk, people may acquire positive implicit normative evaluations towards 
milk. People’s preferences, however, may not be consistent with such normative evaluations. 
Through repeated aversive experience with milk, those who have lactose intolerance, for 
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example, may develop negative implicit attitudes towards milk. These implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations may guide behaviour differently. 
Measurement of Implicit Normative Evaluations 
One purpose of current research is to develop a measure to assess implicit normative 
evaluations. The implicit association test (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) is one of 
the most widely used measures to assess implicit constructs. The IAT measures the strength of 
association between target objects (e.g., flower or insect) and evaluative attributes (e.g., pleasant 
or unpleasant) by having participants classify stimulus items to category labels. In the critical 
blocks, participants categorize exemplars of evaluative attributes (e.g., sunshine, party, or 
disaster) and target items (e.g., photos of flowers or insects) simultaneously. If participants have 
faster response latencies when flowers and pleasant items share the same response than when 
flowers and unpleasant items share the same response, then it is inferred that they have positive 
implicit attitude towards flowers. 
Recently, Olson and Fazio (2004) demonstrated that the traditional IAT is influenced by 
―extrapersonal associations.‖ According to Olson and Fazio (2004), the traditional IAT measures 
not only personal associations, but also associations that people have acquired through 
socialization. To remove ―extrapersonal associations‖ and assess ―purer‖ implicit attitudes, 
Olson and Fazio (2004) modified two features of the traditional IAT. First, based on the finding 
that the IAT is driven by category labels, rather than exemplars (De Houwer, 2001), they 
changed the category labels for evaluative objects from ―pleasant‖ and ―unpleasant‖ to ―I like‖ 
and ―I don’t like.‖  Second, they removed the error feedback because the presence of the error 
message indicates that there is a ―correct‖ answer. They found that the personalized version of 
 
 5 
the IAT was correlated with explicit measures more strongly and predicted behaviour better than 
the traditional IAT. 
Although Olson and Fazio (2004) treated ―extrapersonal associations‖ as error, I propose 
that ―extrapersonal associations‖ may in part reflect implicit normative evaluations. There are 
some hints in the literature that these ―extrapersonal associations‖ may reflect culturally shared 
beliefs or evaluations. For example, the more Korean-Americans and Japanese-Americans were 
exposed to their ethnic cultures, the stronger IAT effects were obtained. More specifically, 
Korean-Americans who had been exposed to Korean culture showed stronger association 
between Korean names and pleasant words than Japanese names and pleasant words. 
Similarly, Japanese-Americans who had been exposed to a Japanese culture showed stronger 
association between Japanese names and pleasant words than Korean names and pleasant words.  
People who have been exposed to their ethnic cultures observe how their in-group members and 
out-group members are treated and depicted in the media and are aware of culturally shared 
beliefs towards them. Therefore, these results suggest that the traditional IAT may be influenced 
by culturally shared associations.  
If Olson and Fazio’s argument (2004) is correct and the traditional IAT is influenced by 
―extrapersonal associations,‖ I may be able to extract these cultural associations by modifying 
the IAT. To test this hypothesis, I created IATs that measure implicit normative evaluations by 
following Olson and Fazio’s methodologies. More specifically, I changed the category labels 
from ―pleasant‖ and ―unpleasant‖ to ―most people like‖ and ―most people don’t like.‖ 
In the first series of studies, I establish the convergent validity and discriminant validity 
of implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations. I examine the domain of flowers vs. 
insects (Study 1a) and apples vs. candy bars (Study 1b) because these domains are often used in 
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IAT research (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004). In 
Study 2, I examine how implicit normative evaluations among immigrants are affected by 
exposure to a new culture. In Study 3, I experimentally manipulate implicit normative 
evaluations in the lab and examine the impact of implicit normative evaluations on 
discriminatory behaviour against people from the Middle East. Finally, in Study 4, I investigate 




















CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPING AND VALIDATING IMPLICIT NORMATIVE 
EVALUTION MEASURES 
The purpose of the first series of the studies is to develop a measure of implicit normative 
evaluations and to begin to validate this measure by examining whether it predicts scores on the 
traditional IAT over and above implicit attitudes. When deciding on how to measure implicit 
normative evaluations I reasoned that the IAT could be adapted to assess this construct. If the 
traditional IAT measures both personal associations and ―extrapersonal associations‖ as Olson 
and Fazio (2004) have argued, then an important source of ―extrapersonal associations‖ from my 
perspective would be implicit normative evaluations. Such implicit normative evaluations would 
also be relatively easy to measure using the IAT. I would simply need to measure the association 
between people’s conceptions of societal evaluations and specific objects of evaluation. For 
example, I could measure people’s association between what they feel most people like or people 
approve of and a given object of evaluation (e.g., flowers or social groups).  
As an initial test of whether such a measure of implicit normative evaluations was valid, 
it would need to predict scores on the traditional IAT above and beyond implicit attitudes. Olson 
and Fazio (2004) demonstrated that association between what ―I like‖ and objects of evaluation 
(what we refer to as implicit attitudes) correlated with scores on the traditional IAT, but not 
perfectly. They argued that the traditional IAT represented both people’s personal association 
(i.e., implicit attitudes) and their extrapersonal associations. If this reasoning is correct, and if 
implicit normative evaluations are an important source of extrapersonal associations as I have 
argued, then implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations should independently predict 




In Study 1a, participants completed the traditional IAT, implicit attitude measure and 
implicit normative evaluation measure in the domain of flower vs. insect. I hypothesized that 
implicit attitudes and normative evaluation measure will independently predict scores on the 
traditional IAT. Furthermore, because most people’s attitudes and normative evaluations towards 
flowers vs. insects are relatively consistent in this domain, I expected that implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations will be correlated with each other.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-three undergraduate students (28 men and 45 women) participated in the 
experiment for credit towards their introductory psychology course. All participants were native 
speakers of English. 
Materials 
 Explicit attitude measure. Participants were asked to indicate their attitudes towards 
flowers and insect using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = I dislike extremely, 7 = I like extremely). To 
make the explicit attitude measures comparable to the IAT, the scores for insects were subtracted 
from those of flowers. Higher values indicate more positive attitudes towards flowers than 
insects. 
 Explicit normative evaluation measures. Participants were asked to indicate normative 
evaluations towards flowers and insect using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = most people dislike 
extremely, 7 = most people like extremely). To make the explicit normative evaluation measures 
comparable to the IAT, scores for insects were again subtracted from those of flowers. Higher 
values indicate more positive normative evaluations towards flowers than insects. 
The traditional IAT. Following the methodology of Greenwald et al. (1998), the IAT had 
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five blocks in total. I used five photos of flowers (carnation, daisy, lily, rose and tulip) and 
insects (ant, cockroach, maggot, fly and wasp, see a complete list for Appendix A) for stimulus 
items (Greenwald et al., 1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). The first block was a practice trial for 
pleasant and unpleasant items, and participants classified pleasant (e.g., friend, party, gift) and 
unpleasant stimulus items (e.g., disaster, evil, death) to the category labels ―pleasant‖ and 
―unpleasant.‖ The second block and fourth block were practice trials for flower and insect items 
in which a participant categorized photos of flowers and insects to the labels ―flower‖ and 
―insect‖ by pressing the response keys. The third block was an incompatible critical block in 
which flowers and unpleasant items share the same response key and insects and pleasant items 
share the same response key. The fifth block was a compatible critical block, in which flowers 
and pleasant items shared the same response key and insects and unpleasant items shared the 
same response key. 
The implicit attitudes measure. The implicit attitudes measure (i.e., association of flowers 
vs. insects with what ―I like‖) was the same as the traditional IAT except that participants were 
asked to distinguish between ―things you might like or dislike‖ using the category labels ―I like‖ 
and ―I don’t like‖ (Olson & Fazio, 2004).   
The implicit normative evaluations measure. The implicit normative evaluations measure 
(i.e., association of flowers vs. insects with what most people like) was also similar to the 
traditional IAT except that participants were asked to distinguish between things most people 
like or dislike using the category labels ―most people like‖ and ―most people don’t like.‖ 
Specifically, I changed the instructions to say, ―the following screens will ask you to distinguish 
between things most people like or dislike. The words most people like refer to what people in 
North America actually like, not what they should like.‖   
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The presence of error feedback suggests that there is a ―correct‖ answer; however, there 
are more variations in individuals or normative preferences (for example, someone—perhaps 
Oscar the grouch—might actually like garbage). Thus, I removed error messages from all three 
types of the IATs. The three IATs were identical except for the category labels and instructions. 
Procedure 
 Participants were invited to the lab in groups of up to four at a time. They practiced the 
traditional flower-insect IAT to become familiar with completing an IAT. Starting one week 
after the lab session, participants completed the traditional IAT, the implicit attitudes measure 
and implicit normative evaluation measure and corresponding explicit measures over the internet 
with each version spaced from 0 to 28 days apart
1 
to reduce potential carryover effects. The 
average days between the measures are 7.93 days. The order of the measures was 
counterbalanced. 
Results and Discussion 
Following Jordan, Spencer, and Zanna (2005), response latencies that were slower than 
3,000 ms were recorded as 3,000 ms and responses that were faster than 300 ms were recorded 
as 300 ms. The scores were obtained by subtracting the average response latencies of the fifth 
block from those of the third block
2
. Higher scores indicated relatively more positive evaluations 
of flowers than insects
3
. I found no differences for the number of days between IAT 
administrations, so I did not analyze for this variable. I analyzed data using a 3 (implicit 
measure: implicit attitudes measure, implicit norms measure, traditional IAT) x 2 (gender) mixed 
                                                          
1
 One participant completed the measures on the same day; however, inclusion or exclusion of 
this participant did not influence the result. I included the participant to be conservative.  
2
 There was no difference in error rates for the traditional IAT, implicit attitude measure and 
implicit norms measure (4.3%, 5.3%, 5.6 %, respectively, F(2, 134) = .94, ns). 
3
 Because I did not counterbalance the order of blocks within the IAT, I do not interpret the 
results in terms of absolute zero. 
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model ANOVA, with implicit measure as a within-participants factor and gender as a between-
participants factor. Neither the main effect for implicit measure nor the main effect for gender 
was significant, Fs < 1. However, there was a significant interaction between implicit measure 
and gender, F(2, 132) = 3.99, p = .02. Follow up analyses indicated that there was a marginal 
gender difference on the implicit attitudes measure, (M(males) = 164.5, M(females) = 229.4; F(1, 132) = 
3.34, p = .07), but no gender differences on the traditional IAT (M(males) = 205.7, M(females) = 
174.7) or the implicit norms measure (M(males) = 226.7, M(females) = 187.9), both Fs < 1.  On the 
implicit attitudes measure, women showed a tendency to have a stronger personal preference for 
flowers than insects. 
As illustrated in Table 1, implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations were 
moderately correlated with each other, r = .42, p < .01. Consistent with the past findings (e.g., 
Greenwald et al., 1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001), implicit and explicit attitudes were not 
correlated with each other. Similarly, implicit and explicit normative evaluations were not 
correlated with each other. 
Table 1.  
Correlation matrix for implicit and explicit attitudes and normative evaluations 











__    
Implicit 
norms 
.42** __   
Explicit 
attitudes 
.09 -.06 __  
Explicit 
norms 




Recall the hypothesis that if the traditional IAT is influenced by both personal association 
and extrapersonal association and if extrapersonal association reflect implicit normative 
evaluations, then implicit attitude and implicit normative evaluations will independently predict 
the scores on the traditional IAT. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a multiple regression 
analysis in which a measure of implicit attitudes and a measure of implicit normative evaluations 
were entered together as predictor variables. As illustrated in Figure 1, consistent with my 
hypothesis implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations both independently predicted 
scores on the traditional IAT, ß = .28, t(68) = 2.36 p = .02, ß = .22, t(68) = 1.86 p = .07, 
respectively, although the effect for implicit normative evaluations was marginally significant.  
Figure 1. The relations of implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations to the traditional 






 The purpose of Study 1b is to replicate the finding of Study 1a in a different domain. I 
chose the domain of apples vs. candy bars because previous IAT research was conducted in this 
domain (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004). Olson and Fazio (2004) found 
that people had more positive evaluations towards apples compared to candy bars on the 
traditional IAT than on a measure of implicit attitude. They argue that apples are portrayed more 
positively than candy bars in our society, whereas there is more variability in individual 
preference for apples vs. candy bars. Based on these findings, I hypothesized that implicit 
Implicit 
Attitudes Traditional IAT 
Implicit Norms 
 
ß = .28* 
ß = .22+ 
r = .42** 
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attitudes and implicit normative evaluations will be loosely associated with each other in this 
domain.  
Method 
 Participants   
The same 73 participants who completed Study 1a completed Study 1b. 
Materials  
 Explicit attitudes measure. I used the same Likert scale to assess participants’ attitudes 
towards apples and candy bars (1 = I dislike extremely, 7 = I like extremely). To make the 
explicit attitude measures comparable to the IAT, an attitude measure was created by subtracting 
the score for candy bars from that of apples. Higher values indicate more positive attitudes 
towards apples than candy bars. 
Implicit measures. I used the similar IATs in this study to those used in the Study 1a. The 
only changes were in stimulus items and category labels. More specifically, participants 
categorized photos of apples and candy bars with category labels ―apple‖ and ―candy bar,‖ 
instead of categorizing photos of flowers and insects with category labels ―flower‖ and ―insect.‖  
The IAT was coded so that higher scores indicated more positive evaluations towards apples than 
candy bars. 
Procedure  
The procedure of Study 1b was the same as in Study 1a, except for the change in the 
materials described above. 
Results and Discussion 
I scored the IATs using the same procedures described in Study 1a. I found no 
differences for the number of days between IAT administrations so I did not analyze for this 
 
 14 
variable. I conducted a 3 (implicit measure: implicit attitudes measure, implicit norms measure, 
traditional IAT) x 2 (gender) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first factor. No significant 
main effects for implicit measure or gender and no interaction between implicit measure and 
gender emerged, Fs < 1 (M = -21.7, SD = 130.1 for the implicit attitudes measure, M = -23.1, SD 
= 133.3 for the implicit norms measure, M = -27.0, SD = 179.7 for the traditional IAT). As can 
be see in Table 2, implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations were not correlated in this 
study, r = .06 ns. Consistent with Study 1a, implicit and explicit attitudes and normative 
evaluations were not correlated with each other. Explicit attitudes and normative evaluation were 
also correlated with each other, suggesting that people’s attitudes and perceived norms are 
consistent at the explicit level. Surprisingly, implicit normative evaluations and explicit attitudes 
were also correlated with each other–a finding we have not observed in any of our other data. 
Table 2.  
 
Correlation matrix for implicit and explicit attitudes and normative evaluations 











__    
Implicit 
norms 
.06 __   
Explicit 
attitudes 
.18 .43** __  
Explicit 
norms 
.20 .17 .49** __ 
 
As shown in Figure 2, multiple regression analysis provided stronger evidence of the 
unique influence of implicit attitudes and normative evaluations on the traditional IAT. Both 
implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations independently predicted scores on the 
traditional IAT, ß = .42, t(65) = 3.81, p < .01, ß = .22, t(65) = 1.99 p = .05, respectively. These 
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Figure 2. The relations of implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations to the traditional 






Replicating Study 1a, Study 1b provided evidence that the traditional IAT is 
independently predicted by both implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations. Moreover, 
in Study 1a implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations toward flowers and insects were 
moderately correlated. In contrast, in Study 1b implicit attitudes and implicit normative 
evaluations towards apples vs. candy bars were not correlated with each other, suggesting that 
people’s implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations are not necessarily consistent with 
each other in this domain. Taken together, Study 1a and Study 1b demonstrated that implicit 
attitudes and implicit normative evaluations appeared to be unique constructs in that they 
uniquely predict scores on a traditional IAT.  
The finding that implicit normative evaluations and implicit attitudes independently 
influence scores on the traditional IAT was replicated in another line of research (Bangard & 
Fein, 2008). After they learned of our studies, they attempted to replicate the main results with 
                                                          
4
 The implicit attitudes towards flowers and insects were not correlated with implicit attitudes 
towards apples and candy bars (r = -. 09, ns). Similarly, implicit norms towards flowers and 
insects were not correlated with implicit norms towards apples and candy bars (r = .13, ns). 




ß = .42** 
ß = .22** 
r = .06 
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implicit attitudes and normative evaluations towards African Americans. They examined 
students’ implicit attitudes and normative evaluations toward African-Americans. Among 
undergraduate students from the introductory psychology course at Williams College, they 
replicated the findings in Study 1a and 1b—both implicit attitudes and normative evaluations 
independently predicted scores on the traditional IAT. 
Interestingly, among students who are involved in a campus group to promote diversity, a 
different effect was obtained. Specifically, among activists, implicit normative evaluations and 
implicit attitudes interacted to predict scores on the traditional IAT. If they had developed 
negative implicit normative evaluations, these normative evaluations were associated with high 
level of implicit prejudice as measured by the traditional IAT even if they did not have negative 
implicit attitudes. These activists showed the same pattern of responses that Arkes and Tetlock 
(2004) speculated that Jesse Jackson might show: they displayed implicit prejudice on the 
traditional IAT even though they had positive implicit attitudes about African-Americans. This 
result suggests that to the extent people are immersed in culture that views racial minorities in a 
negative light, implicit prejudice will appear on the traditional IAT regardless of the level of their 
implicit attitudes and that whether they have negative or positive implicit normative evaluations 








CHAPTER 3: EXAMINING IMPACT OF IMPLICIT NORMATIVE EVALUATIONS 
ON STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE 
Thus far, the data of the first series of studies provided strong evidence for convergent 
and discriminant validity of implicit normative evaluations measure. In the remaining studies, I 
will examine how implicit normative evaluations towards social groups will be shaped and how 
these evaluations will influence discriminatory behaviour.  
Study 2 
In Study 2, I examined how exposure to culturally shared beliefs will shape implicit 
normative evaluations towards social groups. Some findings suggest that the exposure to 
culturally shared beliefs (i.e., normative evaluations) may affect behaviour outside of awareness. 
For example, Ferguson and Hassin (2007) found that the effect of American cues on aggression 
was moderated by the exposure to political news media. Specifically, American cues increased 
aggressive behaviour for those who have been exposed to the American political news media. 
For those who do not regularly follow the news, the effect did not emerge. Their research 
suggests that those who have watched the news media frequently have been exposed to 
descriptive norms about the United States being aggressive (e.g., the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan) and through the media exposure, people may develop implicit normative 
evaluations and these norms may affect behaviour outside of awareness.  
In this study, I examined how people from different culture will change implicit 
normative evaluations over time. People from different cultures are exposed to different cultural 
values or social expectations (Triandis & Suh, 2002). When these people come to a new country, 
they are exposed to a new culture and new norms. How does their experience in this new culture 
shape their implicit normative evaluations? If the arguments I have made about implicit 
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normative evaluations are correct, then exposure to how groups are treated and depicted in the 
new culture should shape people’s implicit normative evaluations over time. To test this 
prediction in the present study I investigate the relation between exposure to Canadian culture as 
measured by time spent in Canada and implicit normative evaluations among Asian-Canadians 
who have immigrated to Canada. I expect that exposure to a Canadian culture will be a 
significant predictor of implicit normative evaluations.  
I expect that the length of time spent in Canada will be a weaker predictor of implicit 
attitudes than implicit normative evaluations. Instead, implicit attitudes will be more strongly 
predicted by the identification with Canadian culture. As I have argued implicit attitudes form 
largely from experience with specific attitude objects (i.e., people in this instance), thus implicit 
attitudes may largely be influenced by identification with the new culture to which people are 
immigrating. If people are highly identified with the culture, they may actively try to take on the 
views commonly held in that culture. In this way, Asian-Canadians who highly identify with 
being Canadian may actively try to take on the negative views of Canadian society toward social 
groups and therefore be more likely to develop negative implicit attitudes. However, implicit 
attitudes will be less affected by exposure to Canadian culture per se or the length of time that 
people have lived in Canadian society than implicit normative evaluations. Similarly, I do not 
propose that explicit attitudes form simply from exposure to the culture either. Rather, I have 
argued that explicit normative evaluations form through conscious reflection on how the objects 
of evaluation (i.e., people in this instance) are treated. Thus, explicit normative evaluations could 
form very quickly or slowly depending on this conscious reflection. 
Norms about the Elderly in Asia 
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According to Sung (2001), traditional East Asian cultures have been influenced by 
Confucian values, which emphasize obedience and respect for parents and older people. 
Therefore, in East Asian cultures people tend to value older people because they tend to associate 
older people with wisdom or maturity. In contrast, in Western cultures, people tend to associate 
older people with senility or weakness, and young people are more valued than older people 
(Streib, 1987). If these cultural values affect people’s implicit attitudes and normative 
evaluations as I predict, then people from East Asia will have more positive implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations towards older people than will people from North America. I also 
hypothesized that Asian-Canadians who have been to Canada for a long time will have more 
negative implicit normative evaluations towards older people than Asian-Canadians who have 
been to Canada for a short time. However, I do not expect that the length of time spent in Canada 
will predict Asian-Canadian’s implicit attitudes towards older people. Rather I expect that 
implicit attitudes will be predicted by Asian-Canadian’s identification with Canadian culture. 
In this study, I operationalize implicit normative evaluations about older people in terms 
of beliefs or values because cross-cultural difference may be more pronounced in beliefs or 
values of older people than preferences. In fact, research found that in Western cultures, older 
people are liked but are not valued (Fiske et al., 2002). Thus, to capture value of older people, 
rather than preferences, I changed two features of the IAT. First, I changed the category labels 
from ―most people like‖ and ―most people don’t like‖ to ―most people believe in‖ and ―most 
people don’t believe in.‖ Second, I used ideological stimulus items that people believe in or 





Eighty-five European-Canadian (23 men and 62 women) and 151 Asian-Canadian (51 
from Hong Kong, 50 from China, 7 from Taiwan, 2 from South Korea, 2 from Malaysia, 1 from 
North Korea, 1 from Vietnam and 37 did not provide information on their country of origin) (56 
men and 95 women) undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo participated in this 
study for course credit or an $8.00 payment.  
Materials 
Acculturation measures. To measure the level of acculturation for Asian-Canadian 
participants, I asked them to indicate the strength of identification with Asian culture and 
Canadian culture on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much)
5
. I also 
assessed the length of time they had spent in Canada
6
. 
Explicit attitudes towards younger and older people. Participants were asked to indicate 
their attitudes towards younger and older people on 7-point semantic differential scales: 
favourable – unfavourable, positive – negative, like – dislike, and desirable – undesirable.  
Explicit normative evaluations about younger and older people. To measure explicit 
normative evaluations towards younger and older people, I asked participants to indicate most 
people's overall opinions or evaluations of younger people or older people on the same semantic 
differential scales as the attitude measures.  
Implicit attitudes towards younger and older people. I used the same implicit attitudes 
measure as in Study 1 except for the category labels and stimulus items. To capture participants’ 
                                                          
5
 Three Asian participants indicated 7 out of 11 when rating how strongly they identified with 
Asian culture; however, inclusion or exclusion of these three participants did not influence the 
results. I reported results including these three participants to be conservative. 
6
 Because I used a mass-testing questionnaire that measured the length of time in country of 
origin, I measured the length of time spent in Canada based on the time spent in country of 
origin. Most people came to Canada directly from their birth country; therefore the length of time 
spent in Canada can be estimated by subtracting the length of time spent in country of origin 
from participants’ ages.  
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implicit attitudes towards younger and older people, I used the implicit attitudes measure with 
category labels, ―I believe in‖ and ―I don’t believe in.‖ I chose ideological exemplars, such as 
sadness, hate, dishonesty, oppression, injustice, happiness, love, honesty, freedom, and justice. 
The other category labels were ―young‖ and ―old‖ and participants were asked to categorize 
photos of younger men and women and older men and women. All the pictures were of 
European-Canadians.  
Implicit normative evaluations about younger and older people. The implicit normative 
evaluations measure was the same as the implicit attitudes measure except that the category 
labels ―I believe in‖ and ―I don't believe in‖ were replaced with the category labels ―most people 
believe in,‖ and ―most people don’t believe in.‖ 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the implicit attitudes measure and implicit normative evaluations 
measure and corresponding explicit measures over the internet. Each IAT was separated from 
three days to 26 days apart (with an average of 6.39 days apart) to reduce potential carryover 
effects. The order of the set of measures was counterbalanced. 
Results and Discussion 
Acculturation measures. The mean length of time that Asian-Canadians spent in Canada 
was 8.76 years (SD = 5.16). In the following analyses the length of time in Canada was log 
transformed (Singer & Willett, 2003) because differences in time spent in Canada were more 
likely to be potent when time in Canada was relatively short than when it was relatively long 
(i.e., the difference between 1 year vs. 2 years in Canada would be more pronounced than the 
difference between 15 years and 16 years). I also measured identification with Canadian culture 
and identification with Asian culture. The mean strength of identification with Canadian culture 
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was 6.97 (SD = 2.01), whereas the mean identification with Asian culture was 8.37 (SD = 1.76). 
The length of time spent in Canada and Canadian identity were modestly correlated with each 
other, r = .19, p < .05. 
Is there any cultural difference in implicit attitudes and normative evaluations? I used the 
same algorithm to calculate IAT scores as in Study 1. Higher scores on the both the implicit 
normative evaluations and implicit attitudes indicate more positive implicit normative 
evaluations and attitudes towards older people. Implicit attitudes and normative evaluations were 
moderately correlated with each other (r = .24, p < .001). 
I examined cross-cultural difference in implicit attitudes and normative evaluations by 
conducting a 2 (ethnicity: European-Canadians vs. Asian-Canadians) x 2(implicit measure: 
implicit attitudes vs. implicit normative evaluations) mixed model ANOVA. There was no 
significant difference between European-Canadians and Asian-Canadians (F < 1, p > .22)
7
.  
Acculturation and implicit normative evaluations. Recall my hypothesis that the exposure 
to cultural norms will shape implicit normative evaluations over time.
8
 To test this reasoning, I 
conducted a regression analysis in which log-transformed length of time spent in Canada 
predicted implicit normative evaluations after controlling for identification with Canadian 
culture, identification with Asian culture, explicit attitudes, explicit normative evaluations, and 
implicit attitudes toward older people. I found that implicit normative evaluations were predicted 
by log-transformed length of time spent in Canada, ß = -.20, t(98) = -2.13, p < .05 but were not 
predicted by identification with Canadian culture. Asian-Canadians who had spent more time in 
                                                          
7
 There were no gender effects in any analyses. Therefore, I did not include gender in any of the 
analyses reported in Study 2.  
8
  If time spent in Canada were correlated with participants’ age, then it would be a potential 
alternative explanation for the results. However, these two variables were not correlated with 
each other (r = -.13 ns). 
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Canada had more negative implicit normative evaluations than Asian Canadians who had 
recently come to Canada (see Figure 3). This result suggested that the longer Asian-Canadian 
spent in Canada, the more negative their implicit normative evaluations towards older people 
became. In addition, implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes also predicted implicit normative 
evaluations, ß = .32, t(98) = 3.43, p = .001, and ß = .20, t(98) = 1.86, p = .07 respectively, all other 
ßs < .05, ts < 1.  
Figure 3. The relations of length of time spent in Canada and strength of identification with 
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Acculturation and implicit attitudes. To test the hypothesis that time spent in Canada 
would not influence implicit attitudes, I conducted a regression analysis in which log-
transformed length of time spent in Canada predicted implicit attitudes, controlling for 
identification with Canadian culture, identification with Asian culture, and explicit attitudes, 
explicit normative evaluations, and implicit normative evaluations towards older people. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, log transformed length of time in Canada was not a significant 
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predictor of implicit attitudes ß = -.03, t < 1, suggesting that exposure to Canadian culture did 
not affect implicit attitudes.  
I expected identification with Canadian culture to be a predictor of implicit attitudes. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, implicit attitudes were marginally predicted by identification 
with Canadian culture, ß = -.17, t(98) = -1.80,  p = .08 and implicit normative evaluations, ß = 
.34, t(98) = 3.43, p = .001. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 4, implicit attitudes tend to be predicted 
by identification with Canadian culture, but are not predicted by the length of time spent in 
Canada. Asian-Canadian immigrants who were more strongly identified with Canadian culture 
tended to have implicit attitudes that were more negative toward the elderly than Asian-Canadian 
immigrants who were less identified with Canadian culture. 
Figure 4. The relations of strength of identification with Canadian culture and length of time in 




























Does the length of time spent in Canada predict explicit normative evaluations? 
I combined the questions about explicit attitudes toward older people (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .88 for younger people, Cronbach’s alpha = .90 for older people), and explicit normative 
evaluations (Cronbach’s alpha = .80 for younger people, Cronbach’s alpha = .89 for older 
people) each into a single index. Then, I subtracted the combined measure for younger people 
from that of older people—as was done in the IAT measures of these constructs; therefore, 
higher values indicate more positive evaluations towards older people than towards younger 
people. 
To test whether length of time spent in Canada will predict explicit normative 
evaluations, I conducted a regression analysis in which log-transformed length of time in Canada 
predicted explicit normative evaluations. Consistent with the hypothesis, I found that log-
transformed length of time in Canada did not predict explicit normative evaluations, ß = .15, 
t(109) = 1.60, ns. 
Study 2 provided further evidence of discriminant validity between implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations. Implicit normative evaluations were predicted by the length of time spent 
in Canada, whereas implicit attitudes were not. In contrast, implicit attitudes tended to be 
predicted by identification with Canadian culture, whereas implicit normative evaluations were 
not. These results suggest that although implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations are 
related, they have different antecedents and are different constructs.  
Furthermore, the data suggested that exposure to cultural norms shaped implicit 
normative evaluations. The longer Asian Canadians stayed in Canada, the more negative their 
implicit normative evaluations towards older people became. However, because of the nature of 
a correlation study, I cannot establish a causal relation. To overcome this limitation, I conducted 
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an experiment and examined how differences in other people’s evaluations influenced implicit 
normative evaluations and consequently discriminatory behaviour.   
Study 3 
Study 3 examines how exposure to other people’s evaluations of a social group will affect 
implicit normative evaluations and behaviour. In this study I examine implicit normative 
evaluations towards people from the Middle East because prejudice and discrimination against 
this group has been a serious issue particularly since September 11, 2001 (e.g., Oswald, 2005). I 
subtly manipulated other people’s evaluation towards people from the Middle East by changing 
the audience’s reactions towards racist jokes targeting people from the Middle East. More 
specifically, when the audience laughs at the racist jokes, that will convey more negative local 
norms towards people from the Middle East than when the audience remains silent. 
I hypothesized that implicit normative evaluations will be influenced by the audiences’ 
reactions towards the racist jokes. As I have argued, implicit normative evaluations are expected 
to be formed by being exposed to other people’s beliefs and preferences. When these beliefs and 
preferences are expressed in subtle ways, people may develop associations between what most 
people like and dislike and people from the Middle East even when they are not consciously 
aware of local norms. Therefore, I hypothesized that when the audience laughs at the racist jokes 
targeting people from the Middle East, people will have negative implicit normative evaluations 
towards them than when the audience remains silent.  
I also hypothesized that the audience’s reactions towards the racist jokes will influence 
discrimination. Past research has demonstrated that people’s opinions or evaluations tend to be 
influenced by other people’s reactions. For example, people’s evaluations of a presidential 
debate performance were influenced by the audience’s reaction. When the audience responded to 
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the speech with cheers and laughter, participants evaluated the speech more favourably than 
when the audience’s reactions were removed (Fein, Goethals & Kugler, 2007). Based on these 
findings, I hypothesized that when the audience laughs at the racist jokes, people will be more 
likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour than when the audience remains silent.  
Furthermore, I hypothesized the influence of the audience reactions on discriminatory 
behaviour will occur through implicit normative evaluations. Theorizing on modern racism 
argues that prejudice and discrimination tends to be expressed in more subtle and unconscious 
ways (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) and tends to be influenced by the salience of social norms 
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). People tend to express negative attitudes towards racial minorities 
when other people endorse prejudicial attitudes or when they can justify their behaviour. 
Therefore, I predicted that people’s discriminatory behaviour will be influenced by the local 




Seventy nine (33 men and 45 women, one person did not indicate gender) European-
Canadian undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo participated in the study in 
exchange for a course credit or an $8.00 payment.  
Materials 
Explicit normative evaluations towards people from the Middle East. Participants were 
asked to indicate how most people feel about typical people from the Middle East using an 
evaluative thermometer (100 = extremely favourable, 0 = extremely unfavourable).  
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Explicit attitudes towards people from the Middle East. To measure explicit attitudes 
towards, I asked participants to indicate how they feel about typical people from the Middle East 
using the same evaluative thermometer (100 = extremely favourable, 0 = extremely 
unfavourable). To conceal the purpose of the study, the explicit normative evaluations and 
attitudes measures about people from the Middle East were embedded with measures for other 
social groups such as union members, African-Canadians, English-Canadians and gays and 
lesbians. 
Implicit normative evaluation measure. I used the same implicit normative evaluations 
measure that I used in Study 1 except for the category labels and stimulus items. I used the 
categories, ―most people like‖ / ―most people don’t like‖ and ―Middle Easterner‖ and ―object.‖ I 
used the category label ―object‖ because the IAT measures relative preference towards one 
concept over the other. Using the category label ―object‖ will make it clear whether participants 
have positive evaluations towards Middle Easterner or not (rather than positive evaluations 
towards North Americans). Participants were asked to categorize photos of people from the 
Middle East and photos of neutral objects (e.g., desk, chair, fork, and stapler).  
Implicit attitudes measure. The implicit attitudes measure was the same as the implicit 
normative evaluations measure except that the category labels ―most people like‖ and ―most 
people don’t like‖ were replaced with ―I like‖ and ―I don’t like.‖ 
Procedures  
A half of the participants completed the implicit attitude measure and the other half 
completed implicit normative evaluations measure and corresponding explicit measures over the 
internet approximately four days before the lab session. Which measure to be completed was 
determined by random assignment. In the lab session, participants viewed a series of stand-up 
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routine comedians, and one of the comedians included a racist joke about people from the 
Middle East. I manipulated the local norms by modifying the audience’s reactions towards the 
joke. In the no laughter condition, the audience’s laughter was removed, which conveyed 
positive normative evaluations towards people from the Middle East (i.e., most people like 
people from the Middle East). In the laughter condition, the audience’s original laughter was 
retained, which conveyed negative norms towards people from the Middle East (i.e., most people 
don’t like people from the Middle East). Immediately after watching the comedians, participants 
completed the same implicit attitudes or normative evaluations measure as the one they 
completed before coming to the lab.  
After participants completed the task, a Caucasian experimenter who was blind to the 
condition told them that the study was over. However, the experimenter asked participants if they 
could fill out a survey from the Federation of Students (FEDS) (Song Hing, Li & Zanna, 2002). 
The experimenter explained to the participants that the FEDS had to cut down budget by 20 % 
(or CA $1,000) for various student organizations and wanted to input from students about the 
budget. One of the student organizations included the Muslim Student Association (MSA) and 
the proportion of money that participants allocated to MSA is a dependent variable (see the 
budget reduction materials in Appendix C). After completing the survey, participants were 
probed for suspicion and fully debriefed. 
Results and Discussion  
The influence of laughter on implicit attitudes and normative evaluations. I used the same 
algorithm to calculate the implicit measures as described in the previous studies. Higher values 
indicate more positive evaluation towards people from the Middle East. I expected that the 
audience’s reaction to the racist jokes would influence implicit normative evaluations, but not 
 
 30 
implicit attitudes. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a 2 (condition: laughter vs. no laughter) x 
2 (implicit measure: implicit attitudes vs. implicit normative evaluations) x 2 (gender: men vs. 
women) between-participant ANOVA to examine the effect of condition on implicit attitudes 
and normative evaluations to test this hypothesis.
9
 There were no significant main effects, but 
there were two significant interactions. First, gender interacted with the implicit measure (F(1,71) 
= 3.93, p = .05) such that men had more positive implicit normative evaluations than women, 
(M(men) = 40.13, SD = 105.82, M(women) = -19.86, SD = 145.84, F( 1, 71) = 6.87, p < .05) but there 
were no gender differences on implicit attitudes (M(men) = -34.45 SD = 127.64, M(women) = -6.31, 
SD = 92.88, ns). It thus seems that women may have developed implicit normative evaluations 
about people from the Middle East that more strongly represent the negative depiction of these 
people in society.  
Second, and more relevant for my hypotheses, there was a significant interaction between 
condition and implicit measure F(1, 71) = 5.33, p < .05. As depicted in Figure 5, implicit normative 
evaluations were influenced by the audience’s reactions to the racist jokes, F(1, 71) = 6.63, p < .05, 
whereas implicit attitudes were not, F(1, 71) < 1, p > .34. Those who were exposed to the audience 
who laughed at the racist jokes had significantly more negative normative evaluations towards 





                                                          
9
 I excluded two outliers for this analysis. 
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Figure 5. Implicit attitudes vs. normative evaluations towards people from the Middle East as a 















The influence of laughter on discriminatory behaviour. I examined discriminatory 
behaviour by measuring how much money participants gave to the Muslim Student Association 
(MSA) on campus. I expected that when the audience laughed at the racist jokes participants 
would give less money to this group than when the audience remained silent after the joke was 
told. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a 2 (condition: laughter vs. no laughter) x 2 (implicit 
measure: implicit attitudes vs. implicit normative evaluations) X 2 (gender: men vs. women) 
between-participant ANOVA to examine this hypothesis
10
.The only significant effect was a main 
effect for condition F(1, 71) = 4.21, p < .05. Consistent with my hypothesis, participants in the 
laughter condition allocated significantly less money to MSA than those in the no laughter 
                                                          
10
 I excluded two people who did not complete the budget allocation measure by not giving any 
money to the MSA and other groups as well). 
No Laughter  Laughter 
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condition, M = 380, SD = 120 (31 % reduction); M = 431.2, SD = 80 (25 % reduction), 
respectively. 
Figure 6. The amount of money that was allocated to the Muslim Student Association as a 
function of the condition  
 
 
Does the laughter condition affect discriminatory behaviour through implicit normative 
evaluations? To test whether the effect of the laughter condition on discriminatory behaviour 
was accounted for by implicit normative evaluations towards people from the Middle East, I 
used bootstrapping techniques developed by Preacher and Hayes (2004). First, I entered 
condition into a regression equation to predict implicit normative evaluations towards people 
from the Middle East, and the results indicated that the condition predicted implicit normative 
evaluations, such that those who were in the laughter condition had significantly more negative 
implicit normative evaluations towards people from the Middle East, β = .30, t(46) = 2.13, p < .05. 
Next, when condition and implicit norm were simultaneously entered into the regression 
equation to predict the budget allocated to MSA, condition was no longer significant, t(45) = .32, 
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p = .75. Consistent with my hypothesis, those who were exposed to the audience who laughed at 
the racist jokes had significantly more negative implicit normative evaluations towards them, 
which predicted greater reduction of the budget for the MSA, β = .32, t(45) = 2.11, p < .05. The 
strength of the indirect effect is estimated by using a confidence interval (CI). I set a 95 % CI for 
this analysis, and if the upper and lower limits of the CI do not include zero, then the result 
indicates that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero at p < .05. Based on 10000 
bootstrap resamples, I found that this indirect effect was significant CI = .003 to .096, p < .05 
(see Figure 7).  
 









 Consistent with my hypothesis, people who were exposed to the audience who laughed at 
the racist jokes had more negative implicit normative evaluations towards people from the 
Middle East than those who were exposed to the audience who remained silent. I also found that 
people were more likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour when the audience supported 
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normative evaluations. The more negative implicit normative evaluations towards people from 
the Middle East were, the more people engaged in discriminatory behaviour. Furthermore, 
because implicit attitudes were not influenced by the local norms, I did not conduct the same 
meditation analysis for implicit attitudes. Nevertheless, implicit attitudes did not predict 
discriminatory behaviour (β = -.09, t(26) = .46, ns).  
In this study, I was able to manipulate implicit normative evaluations by changing subtle 
cues of other people’s evaluations towards people from the Middle East. These subtle cues had 
an impact on discriminatory behaviour even when people were not consciously aware of what 
most people like or dislike. Moreover, implicit attitudes were not affected by the audience’s 
reactions or predicted discriminatory behaviour, suggesting that implicit attitudes and normative 
evaluations have different antecedents and consequences. The salience of local norms did not 
change implicit attitudes because implicit attitudes are presumably developed through direct 
interaction with social groups, rather than just being exposed to other people’s subtle expression 
of their preference. These findings provided further discriminant validity of implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations.  
Study 4 
Study 4 examines the issue of violence against Black people because in this domain 
people’s personal experience with Black people and normative evaluations towards them tend to 
diverge. People are likely to encounter Black people in mundane contexts such as at workplace, 
school or grocery stores. Given that implicit attitudes are well learned personal evaluations that 
people have developed through repeated experience (Rudman, Phelan & Heppen, 2007), one can 
imagine that implicit attitudes towards Black people will be related to everyday behaviour. 
Indeed, research has shown that implicit attitudes towards African Americans predicted 
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nonverbal behaviour in everyday contexts such as an interracial interaction (Dovidio, Kawakami, 
Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997).  
In contrast, I argue that implicit normative evaluations are shaped through repeated 
exposure to portrayals of Black people in the media or how other people treat them. In North 
American society, Black people are depicted in the context of physical fights or shooting in the 
media reinforcing dangerous or violent images of Black people. In addition, people may observe 
how other people are cautious about Black people or subtly avoid them (Chen & Bargh, 1999). 
Therefore, implicit normative evaluations towards Black people may reflect societal views of 
Black people being more dangerous or violent than they really are. 
If you encounter a Black person and have to figure out quickly whether the person is 
armed or not, what factors will influence your decision? In 1999, Amadou Diallo, an African 
immigrant was shot by four police officers. They ordered him to freeze; however, he reached 
into his pocket. They fired 41 shots and 19 of them hit and killed him. What he was trying to 
reach turned out to be a wallet. Why did police officers think that he possessed a gun? Would 
they have decided to shoot him if he had been White? This incident spurred social psychologists 
to examine such shooting scientifically. More specifically, Correll and his colleagues (2002) 
developed a computer simulation in which participants ―shoot‖ a target who is holding a gun and 
do not ―shoot‖ a target who is holding a harmless object (e.g., cell phone). They found that when 
a target did not have a gun participants were slower to not shoot an African American than a 
European American. When a target had a gun participants were faster to shoot an African 
American than a European American. They examined the accuracy of responses by using a 
shorter response window (630 ms) and found that when participants had to make decisions 
quickly they were more likely to shoot an African American than a European American. 
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Similarly, participants were more likely to fail to shoot a European American with a gun than an 
African American. Correll and his colleagues labeled this bias the shooter bias.  
Study 4 examines whether implicit normative evaluations will be related to the shooter 
bias. Previous studies found that implicit and explicit attitudes were not related to the shooter 
bias (Correll et al, 2002), suggesting that the shooter bias is not caused by negative attitudes 
towards African Americans. Although why implicit attitudes did not predict the shooter bias has 
not been established, I can speculate why this is the case based on my reasoning of how implicit 
attitudes are shaped. I argue that implicit attitudes towards Black people are shaped through 
repeated interaction with them. It seems unlikely that many people have repeatedly encountered 
Black people when the primary decision has been whether or not to act violently toward them. 
Rather, most social interactions are likely to be much more mundane. Therefore, implicit 
attitudes are not expected to be related to the shooter bias. In contrast, by living in North 
American society people are exposed to numerous media depiction of Black people being 
involved in shooting; therefore, implicit normative evaluations are expected to be formed 
through exposure to media depictions of violent aspects of Black people.  
These implicit normative evaluations towards Black people may not be consistent with 
implicit attitudes. Even if one has pleasant interactions with African Americans and has positive 
implicit attitudes towards them, it is still quite possible that they will be exposed to negative 
treatment and depictions of Black people, and this exposure through implicit normative 
evaluations may well affect the shooter bias. In other words, to the extent that people have 
implicit normative evaluations of Black people being dangerous or violent, these beliefs may 
affect their split second decision of whether an Black target possesses a gun or not. Based on this 
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reasoning, I hypothesized that the shooter bias would be related to implicit normative evaluations 
but not implicit attitudes.  
I also hypothesized that the shooter bias will not be related to explicit normative 
evaluations. Research on automaticity has shown that automatic processes are efficient and can 
operate when cognitive resources are limited. In contrast, deliberative processes require much 
more cognitive resources (Bargh et al., 1992). Therefore, when people make a judgment under 
time pressure, automatic processes will predict behaviour better than deliberative processes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Method 
Participants 
Sixty three undergraduate students (23 men and 40 women) participated in the study in 
exchange for $8.00. The ethnic breakdown of the participants was 40 European-Canadian, 19 
Asian-Canadian (14 from East Asia and 5 from South Asia), 2 people from the Middle East and 
2 participants that did not indicate their ethnicity.  
Materials 
Explicit normative evaluations towards African Canadians. Participants were asked to 
indicate most people’s overall impressions about African Canadians using an evaluative 
thermometer from 0 (negative) to 100 (positive). The evaluations towards African Canadians 
were embedded with other social groups (e.g., Asians, French Canadians etc…) to disguise the 
purpose of the study.   
Perceived Discrimination in Merit Assessment Scale (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 
2002).  This scale assessed participants’ perceived discrimination against visible minorities in the 
workplace. An example item from this scale is ―Historically, subtle personal biases of job 
interviewers disadvantaged visible minority job applicants in the assessment of their 
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qualifications.‖  The item responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
(Cronbach’s α = .93) (see the actual scale in Appendix B). 
Explicit attitudes towards African Canadians. I used the same evaluative thermometer to 
assess explicit attitudes towards African Canadians. Participants were asked to indicate their 
overall impressions of African Canadians using the number 0 (negative) to 100 (positive).  
Old-Fashioned Racism Scale (Brigham, 1972). This scale assesses participants’ explicit 
attitudes towards African Canadians. The example of the item is ―It is likely that blacks will 
bring violence to neighbourhoods when they move in‖ (Cronbach’s α =.80) (see Appendix D). 
Implicit normative evaluation measure. I used the same implicit normative evaluation 
measure as the one used in previous studies except for the category labels and stimulus items. 
The category labels were ―most people like‖ ―most people don’t like‖ and ―Black‖ and ―object.‖ 
Participants were asked to categorize photos of African Canadians and photos of objects as 
quickly and accurately as possible. Higher values on this measure indicate positive normative 
evaluations towards African Canadian. 
Implicit attitudes measure. The implicit attitudes measure was the same as the implicit 
normative evaluation measure except that the category labels were ―I like‖ and ―I don’t like.‖ 
The higher values indicate positive implicit attitudes towards African Canadians.  
Motivation to control prejudiced reaction scale (Dunton & Fazio,1997). This scale 
assesses the individual difference in motivation to control expression of prejudice. An example 
item is ―I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person‖ 
(Cronbach’s α =.88) (see Appendix E). 
Computer simulation. The program was developed by Correll and his colleagues (2002) 
using PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). The computer 
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simulation had a total of 80 target images which were presented with 20 photos of various 
backgrounds. The target consisted of 25 African American and 25 European American models, 
and each of them appeared twice, one holding a gun and the other holding a harmless object 
(e.g., cell phone) in five basic poses. There were total of 100 images (25 for each condition: 
African American with a gun, African American with a harmless object, European American 
with a gun and European American with a harmless object). The images of the target were 
randomly superimposed on various backgrounds with each type of target appearing in each 
background with the equal frequency. 
In each trial, zero to three photos of unpopulated backgrounds appeared on a computer 
screen. The number of background photos and the duration of the presentation (500 ms – 800 
ms) were randomly determined. Following the presentation of the preliminary backgrounds, a 
final background was presented, which was replaced by a photo of a target model superimposed 
on the final background. From a participant’s perspective, the target model seemed to appear on 
the background.  
Participants were asked to ―shoot‖ a target who was holding a gun and ―not shoot‖ a 
target who was holding a harmless object by pressing a response key as quickly as possible. 
Participants earned points based on their performance. They earned five points if they did not 
―shoot‖ a target who was holding a harmless object, but if they did they would lose 20 points as a 
penalty of shooting an innocent victim. They earned 10 points by ―shooting‖ an armed target, but 
failing to ―shoot‖ an armed target resulted in loss of 40 points as a penalty. If participants did not 
respond within the 850 ms response window, they would lose 10 points. Visual and auditory 
feedback on participants’ responses was presented at the end of each trial. There were 16 practice 




Participants were asked to complete the implicit attitudes measures implicit normative 
evaluation measures and the corresponding explicit measures approximately four to eight days 
before coming to the lab. The attitude measures and normative evaluation measures were 
separated by at least four days to reduce carryover effects. The order of attitudes measure and 
normative evaluation measure was counterbalanced. In the lab session, a Caucasian female 
experimenter explained the detailed procedures of the computer simulation. She also explained 
that participants had an opportunity to earn up to $5.00 if they perform well. The purpose of 
monetary incentive was to ensure sustained effort on the computer simulation. After completing 
the computer simulation, the participants were fully debriefed.  
Results and Discussion 
Do people respond to a Black and White target differently? Following Correll’s 
procedures (2002), the response latencies for incorrect responses or time out were excluded from 
the analyses. To examine whether there is any difference in response latencies, I conducted a 2 
(ethnicity of target: African American vs. European American) x 2 (object: gun vs. no gun) 
ANOVA with ethnicity of target and object as within-subject factors. Replicating Correll’s 
findings (2002), there was a significant main effect of object, such that people responded to a 
target who was holding a gun faster than to target who was holding a harmless object, M = 
561.42, M = 627.11, respectively, F(1, 51) = 343.15, p < .0001. There was also a significant 
interaction between object and ethnicity of target, suggesting that the response latencies of target 
with a gun vs. no gun depended on the target’s ethnicity F(1, 51) = 71.91, p < .0001. Simple 
effects of object and ethnicity revealed that when participants were exposed to unarmed target, it 
took them more time to ―not shoot‖ the African American targets than the European American 
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targets M = 619.02 vs. 635.20, respectively, F(1, 51) = 28.36, p < .0001. When participants 
responded to target who was holding a gun they were faster to ―shoot‖ an African American 




Error rates of the shooter bias. The shooter bias task had a response window (850 ms) 
that was long enough to minimize the error rates. The average error rate was 1.28% and thus was 
quite low. Nevertheless, to examine the differences in the error rates in the condition, a 2 
(ethnicity of target: European American vs. African American) x 2 (object: gun vs. no gun) 
ANOVA with ethnicity and object as within-subject factors was conducted. Consistent with the 
previous findings (Correll et al., 2002), a weaker shooter bias appeared in error rates. There was 
a marginally significant interaction between ethnicity of target and object, F(1, 51) = 3.79, p < 
.06. Simple effects test showed a significant effect on armed target, such that people failed to 
―shoot‖ an armed target (i.e., miss) when the target was European American than when the target 
was African American (M = 1.37 vs .98, respectively), F(1, 51) = 4.07, p < .05. The simple effect 
of unarmed target was not significant F(1, 51) = .61, n.s. 
Do differences response latencies and the decision criterion explain Amadou Diallo’s 
case? The pattern of results suggests that people tend to take longer to detect a harmless object 
when a target is Black than when a target is White. Therefore, one can imagine that under time 
pressure people will be more likely to shoot an innocent Black target than an innocent White 
target. Indeed, past studies found that when people were under time pressure in a response 
window of 630 ms, they were more likely to shoot an innocent Black target than an innocent 
                                                          
11
 Female participants showed significantly stronger shooter bias than did male students (F(1, 51) 
= .037, p < .05). However, the interactions between ethnicity of target and object were 
significant for both male students and female students (F(1, 51) = 12.16, p < .05, F(1,51) = 
72.80, p < .001, respectively). 
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White target (Correll et al, 2002). Given that police officers are not immune to the shooter bias 
(Correll et al., 2007), the shooter bias may emerge even among those who have received a 
professional training.  
Why does the shooter bias emerge? Because the interaction between object and ethnicity 
of target was significant, I created an index of the magnitude of the shooter bias based on 
response latencies. More specifically, I subtracted the response latencies for African American 
armed target from those of European American armed target. Then, I subtracted the response 
latencies for European American unarmed target from those of African American unarmed 
target. I added these response latencies together. The higher values indicate faster response 
latencies for armed African American target than armed European American target and for 
unarmed European American target than unarmed African American target (i.e., a stronger 
shooter bias). I then examined the relation of the shooter bias index to measures of racism, 
implicit and explicit attitudes, and implicit and explicit normative evaluations. 
The evaluative thermometer and Old-Fashioned Racism scale showed a reasonably strong 
negative correlation (r = -.46, p < .01); therefore, I reverse scored the evaluative thermometer 
scores and standardized them as well as Old-Fashioned Racism scores. Then, I obtained the 
average scores between these two standardized scores to create an index of explicit attitudes 
towards African Canadians. The scores were then reversed such that higher values indicated 
more positive attitudes towards African Canadians. Regarding the explicit normative evaluation 
measures, the evaluative thermometer was not correlated with perceived discrimination in merit 
assessment scale (r = .05). Therefore, I examined the correlation between the shooter bias and 
these explicit normative evaluation measures separately. The correlation matrix was summarized 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3.  




























     
Implicit 
norms 
-.30* .15 __ 
 
    
Explicit 
Attitudes 
.27+ .21 .07 __ 
 
   
Explicit 
norms 





.16 .01 .19 .08 .05 __ 
 
 
MCP -.12 .08 .22 .05 .16 .35** __ 
 
Note: MCP = motivation to control scale, Perceived bias = Perceived Discrimination in Merit 
Assessment Scale  (* p < .05    ** p < .01  + p < .10) 
Recall our hypothesis that the shooter bias will not be related to explicit constructs. 
Because participants made a decision under time pressure, the shooting task was operated in 
relatively automatic processes. Consistent with the hypothesis and previous studies (Correll et 
al., 2002), implicit or explicit attitude measures or motivation to control prejudice were not 
correlated with either types of the shooter bias. 
As can be seen in Table 3, negative normative evaluations towards African Canadians 
were related to stronger shooter bias. Why would implicit normative evaluations be correlated 
with the shooter bias? I argue that by living in a society, people are exposed to negative 
treatment or depictions of African Canadians and this exposure shapes people’s implicit 
normative evaluations that most people associate African Canadians with being violent or 
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aggressive. Because these associations are likely to be well learned and efficient, they can affect 
split second decision making more strongly than explicit constructs. 
These implicit normative evaluations are independent of personal attitudes or beliefs 
(Devine 1989). Indeed, the data showed that the implicit attitudes and normative evaluations are 
at most weakly correlated with each other (r = .15, ns). I argue that implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations develop in different ways. Specifically, I argue that implicit attitudes 
develop through personal experience, whereas implicit normative evaluations will develop 
through exposure to how most people treat and evaluate social groups. Because people are not 
likely to have experience with Black people in the context of shooting or violent crimes, implicit 
attitudes may not be related to these aspects. In contrast, implicit normative evaluations may 
reflect violent aspects of Black people that are portrayed in the media. Consistent with this 
reasoning, implicit normative evaluations towards Black people were significantly more negative 
than implicit attitudes (M(norms) = - 42.5 SD = 195.9 vs. M(attitudes) = 22.8 SD = 158.6), F(1, 56) = 
4.45, p < .05). Furthermore, when implicit attitude and normative evaluation were entered in the 
regression equation simultaneously, negative implicit attitudes marginally predicted less shooter 
bias, whereas negative implicit normative evaluation significantly predicted more shooter bias, ß 
= .27, t(42) = 1.83, p = .07, ß = -.37, t(42) = -2.53, p = .015, respectively. Therefore, even if people 
develop positive implicit attitudes towards African Canadians, they still may be affected by 







CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The first series of studies established the convergent and discriminant validity of implicit 
normative evaluation measures. Study 1a and 1b showed that implicit normative evaluations and 
implicit attitudes predicted the traditional IAT independently, suggesting implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations are independent constructs. Study 1a and b also provided evidence that 
implicit normative evaluations can be measured by using a modified version of the IAT. Study 2 
provided further discriminant validity of implicit normative evaluations by demonstrating that 
implicit attitudes and normative evaluations are predicted by different acculturation measures for 
Asian-Canadians. Specifically, the length of time spent in Canada predicted implicit normative 
evaluations of older people such that the longer Asian-Canadians spent in Canada, the more 
negative their implicit normative evaluations towards older people became. In contrast, their 
implicit attitudes were predicted by the strength of identification with Canadian culture. This 
study also shows that the exposure to cultural norms shapes implicit normative evaluations 
towards social groups.  
Study 3 examines how exposure to other people’s reactions will shape implicit normative 
evaluations more directly in an experiment. When White participants were exposed to an 
audience who laughed at the offensive racist jokes targeting people from the Middle East, they 
exhibited significantly more negative implicit normative evaluations towards people from the 
Middle East than White participants who were exposed to the audience who did not laugh at the 
racist jokes. Furthermore, White participants who had more negative implicit normative 
evaluations tended to engage in discriminatory behaviour by providing less money to the Muslim 
Student Association.  
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Finally, Study 4 showed that implicit normative evaluations towards African-Canadians 
predicted the shooter bias such that those who have negative implicit normative evaluations 
towards African-Canadians took more time to avoid shooting a target without a gun and 
established a more lenient criterion for shooting a target when the target was African Canadian 
than when the target was European Canadian. Consistent with previous research (Correll et al., 
2002), implicit attitudes were not correlated with the shooter bias. These results suggest that 
people’s decisions to ―shoot‖ or ―not shoot‖ a target may be partly influenced by societal views 
of African Canadians that they are violent or aggressive. Taken together, these studies provide 
evidence that implicit normative evaluations can be measured and be shaped by exposure to 
cultural norms and that they predict behaviour.  
Implicit Attitudes vs. Normative Evaluations 
The current research has demonstrated that implicit attitudes and normative evaluations 
are formed in different ways and predict behaviour in different contexts. Research has shown 
that implicit attitudes are formed through early life experience (Rudman, Phelan & Heppen, 
2007), by figuring out what the world is like and how things will work. In contrast, I argue that 
implicit normative evaluations are formed by exposure to other people’s beliefs, preferences or 
behaviour in a given context because understanding other people’s preferences or beliefs is an 
important task to be a good member of a group (Schachter, 1951). Consistent with this reasoning, 
Study 2 showed that exposure to culturally shared beliefs about older people influenced implicit 
normative evaluations. More specifically, the more Asian-Canadians were exposed to a Canadian 
culture, the more their implicit normative evaluations towards older people became consistent 
with Canadian normative beliefs and became more negative. However, implicit attitudes were 
not affected by exposure to Canadian culture. 
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Similarly, Study 3 found that those who were exposed to the audience who laughed at 
offensive racist jokes exhibited more negative implicit normative evaluations towards people 
from the Middle East. These implicit normative evaluations led to discriminatory behaviour such 
that the more negative implicit normative evaluations towards people from the Middle East 
became, the more they engaged in discriminatory behaviour. These results suggest that implicit 
normative evaluations play an important role in expression of prejudice and discrimination. 
Importantly, this study showed that implicit attitudes were not affected by exposure to the 
audience’s reactions neither did implicit attitudes predict discriminatory behaviour, suggesting 
that implicit attitudes and normative evaluations are different constructs and have different 
antecedents and consequences.  
Finally, Study 4 examined a domain in which the formation of implicit attitudes and 
normative evaluations tend to diverge. If implicit attitudes towards Black people are formed 
through experience with them, then implicit attitudes should be related to mundane behaviour or 
events. Most people do not have opportunities to interact with Black people in dangerous 
situations that involve shooting or physical fights as depicted in the media. In contrast, most 
people in North American society are exposed to depictions of Black people as violent or 
dangerous. Therefore, implicit normative evaluations towards Black people may reflect 
culturally shared beliefs about Black people being more dangerous or violent than most people 
actually find through personal experience. Consistent with this reasoning, I found that implicit 
attitudes were more positive than implicit normative evaluations. Furthermore, the shooter bias 
was related to the implicit normative evaluations about Black people but not implicit attitudes. 
This pattern of results suggests that implicit attitudes and normative evaluations are shaped 
through different processes and predict behaviour differently.  
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The current research has focused on the conditions under which implicit normative 
evaluations are shaped and influence behaviour. I found that implicit normative evaluations 
predicted behaviour over and above implicit attitudes. Studies 1a and 1b show that implicit 
normative evaluations predicted the traditional IAT after controlling for implicit attitudes. 
Similarly, Study 2 shows that the length of time spent in Canada predicted implicit normative 
evaluations towards older people after controlling for implicit attitudes for Asian-Canadian 
participants. In Study 4, the significant correlation between implicit normative evaluations and 
the shooter bias remained even after controlling for implicit attitudes. Moreover, implicit 
normative evaluations predicted behaviour when implicit attitudes failed to predict the same 
behaviour. These results support the validity of implicit normative evaluations and antecedents 
and consequences of implicit normative evaluations. However, these results do not necessarily 
suggest that implicit attitudes do not play a role in predicting discriminatory behaviour. 
Extensive literature documented that implicit attitudes predict behaviour when the self 
evaluations are salient, such as interracial interaction (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997), consumer 
behaviour (e.g., Maison, Greenwald & Bruin, 2004) and voting behaviour (Olson & Fazio, 
2004). I speculate that implicit attitudes will be shaped through personal experience and that 
when the self evaluations have important outcomes implicit attitudes will predict behaviour. In 
contrast, implicit normative evaluations will be shaped through exposure to other people’s 
reactions and when normative influences become salient, implicit normative evaluations will 
influence behaviour. Future research should examine these conditions empirically.  
The current research demonstrated that implicit attitudes and normative evaluations are 
independent constructs and have different antecedents and consequences. Although I have not 
examined how implicit attitudes and implicit normative evaluations will be related to each other, 
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it seems reasonable that under certain conditions, these two constructs may influence each other. 
For example, if people have negative implicit attitudes towards social groups or objects, how 
they treat or depict these social groups or objects may be subtly influenced by the negative 
implicit attitudes, which may create negative normative evaluations in others. Similarly, negative 
normative evaluations towards social groups or objects may affect how people interact with these 
social groups or objects outside of awareness and these experiences may shape implicit attitudes. 
Future research should examine these conditions empirically.  
Limitations of Measurements of Implicit Normative Evaluations 
Category labels. I used the category labels ―flower‖ vs. ―insect‖ / ―apple‖ vs. ―candy bar‖ 
in the first series of studies and ―young‖ vs. ―old‖ in the second study.  However, because the 
IAT effects are interpreted as a relative preference, it is not clear whether people have positive 
evaluation of one object or negative evaluation of the other object (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000). To overcome these limitations, in Studies 3 and 4, I chose the category labels ―Middle 
Easterner‖ vs. ―object‖ and ―Black‖ vs. ―object‖ assuming that the category label ―object‖ will 
provide baseline evaluations. Future research should examine this assumption empirically.  
 In Study 3, I used the category label ―Middle Easterner‖ referring to people from the 
Middle East. However, the operationalization may not have caught the complex issues of 
prejudice and discrimination against Arabs and Muslims. Arabs and Muslims are targets of 
discrimination even if they are not from the Middle East (Meer, 2008). Although the implicit 
normative evaluation measure was influenced by the audience’s laughter and predicted 
discriminatory behaviour, ideally I could have validated the category labels.  
Reference group. Throughout the studies, the instruction of the IAT says ―most people‖ 
refers to people in North America; however, the reference groups have not been empirically 
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examined. It is not established if it will make a difference whether ―most people‖ is in-group or 
out-group members. 
In particular, in Study 2 I used photos of Caucasian older and younger people for implicit 
measures. These photos may have implied the reference group and participants may have 
assumed that ―most people‖ were people who lived in Canada. If I had used photos of Asian 
older and younger people, then participants might have assumed that most people were people in 
Asia. Future studies should examine how change in a reference group will affect pattern of 
results. If reference groups affect the patterns of results, then tailoring category labels may be 
required. Future research should examine this issue empirically. 
Operationalization of normative evaluations. I operationalized implicit normative 
evaluations based on most people’s preferences or beliefs. Therefore, based on beliefs or 
preferences that I would like to examine, I used the category labels ―most people like‖ or ―most 
people believe in.‖ However, it is not clear whether normative evaluations about beliefs (―most 
people believe in‖) function in the same way as preferences (―most people like‖). In addition, 
literature has separated the influence of descriptive vs. injunctive normative evaluations 
(Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). Descriptive norms are defined as beliefs, preferences or 
behaviour that most people engage in and injunctive norms are defined as beliefs or behaviour 
that people should engage in (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). In this research, I have 
examined how descriptive normative evaluations will be shaped outside of awareness and how 
these normative evaluations will influence behaviour. However, it is important to examine the 
antecedents and consequences of injunctive normative evaluations and relation between these 
two types of norms. Future research should examine appropriate use of category labels to assess 
implicit normative evaluations empirically.  
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Limitations of Designs of Studies 
In Study 2, I examined how implicit normative evaluations towards older people will 
change after Asian-Canadians come to Canada. However, because this issue was examined using  
a cross-sectional design, I cannot examine the process through which implicit normative 
evaluations will change overtime. Future research should examine this issue longitudinally.   
 Study 4 employed a correlational design; therefore, it is not clear whether negative 
implicit normative evaluations cause the shooter bias or these negative implicit normative 
evaluations are a product of the shooter bias. Future study should examine this issue 
experimentally. Nevertheless, to overcome this issue, in Study 3 I experimentally manipulated 
normative evaluations by changing the audience’s reactions towards people from the Middle 
East. 
External validity. Because I examined the influence of normative evaluations on 
prejudice and discrimination in controlled laboratory settings, it is not established how much of 
our results can be applied to the real world. For example, although Study 3 examined 
consequential discriminatory behaviour, I have not examined discrimination in the context of a 
face to face interaction with a target. Similarly, in Study 4 I used a computer simulation and 
participants were asked to indicate their responses by pressing a response key. Although I 
provided incentive to motivate participants to do well, it is not feasible to examine behaviour 
under the psychological pressure that people would experience when they encounter someone 
who is holding something in a dangerous situation.  
Implications for Research on Implicit Processes 
Although the constructs of implicit normative evaluations are not new and traditionally 
social psychologists have examined these constructs, this research is the first to demonstrate that 
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implicit normative evaluations can be measured by using a modified version of the IAT. The first 
series of studies demonstrated that the traditional IAT is independently predicted by both implicit 
attitudes and normative evaluations. These results suggest that implicit normative evaluations 
and attitudes are not the same constructs and the traditional IAT is influenced by these two 
distinct associations. When attitudes and normative evaluations are congruent with each other, 
the traditional IAT can capture these constructs. However, when attitudes and normative 
evaluations are incongruent with each other, such as predicting behaviour in the opposite 
direction, then the traditional IAT will not be able to detect the effect. For example, in our 
society vegetables are considered healthy and desirable; however, individual preferences may not 
always be consistent with what culture prescribes. Indeed, I found that implicit attitudes towards 
vegetables predicted how much vegetables European-Canadians ate in the lab, such that those 
who have positive implicit attitudes towards vegetables ate more vegetables. In contrast, implicit 
normative evaluations predicted eating behaviour in the opposite directions such that European-
Canadians who have positive implicit normative evaluations towards vegetables ate less 
vegetables (Yoshida, et al., 2009). The traditional IAT would not predict eating behaviour in this 
case. By separating the personal association and normative associations, I extended the IAT 
research.  
Implications for Stereotyping and Prejudice Research 
Research has documented that expression of prejudice and discrimination has changed 
and people no longer endorse blatant forms of prejudice. However, subtle forms of prejudice still 
persist and people tend to express prejudice or discrimination in ambiguous situations or when 
there is an excuse to do so (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). Social norms also play a role in these 
expressions (Blanchard et al., 1994; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Past research that examined 
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normative influences on stereotyping and prejudice often manipulated other people’s reactions or 
assessed normative influences at the explicit level. For example, White participants exposed to a 
confederate who expresses antiracist views were more likely to express antiracist views than 
those who were not exposed to the confederate. Similarly, those who were exposed to a 
confederate who endorses racist views were more likely to express more racist views than those 
who were not exposed to the confederate (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994). 
However, these studies did not assess normative evaluations at the implicit level. People may not 
be aware of the influences or asking them about these questions may make people suspicious of 
the purpose of the study. By using a measurement tool to assess implicit normative evaluations, I 
can identify the mechanism under which these effects are obtained. 
Practical Implications 
Our research has shown that implicit normative evaluations play a role in expression of 
prejudice or discrimination. When people are exposed to negative normative evaluations about 
social groups, people are more likely to form negative implicit normative evaluations towards 
them and are more likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour. Moreover, people are often 
unaware of the influences of normative evaluations on their behaviour. What can we do to reduce 
prejudice or discrimination? 
Given that prejudice and discrimination tends to be expressed in subtle ways (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000) changing explicit normative evaluations may not effectively reduce prejudice. 
People already endorse egalitarian values and are motivated to believe that they are not 
prejudiced (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). I propose that changing subtle normative evaluations in 
ambiguous situations may be effective to reduce prejudice and discrimination. Indeed Study 3 
showed that when people are exposed to the audience who did not laugh at the offensive racist 
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jokes were less likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour. If treatments or depictions of social 
groups have been improved, people may pick up these subtle changes, which may have positive 
impact on behaviour. This view is consistent with Allport’s insight (1954):  
 Suppose the child attends a lesson in intercultural education in the classroom. The    
chances are this lesson will be smothered by the more embracing norms of his family,  
gang, or neighbourhood. To change the child’s attitudes it would be necessary to alter the  
cultural equilibrium of these, to him, more important groups. It would be necessary for  
the family, the gang, or the neighbourhood to sanction tolerance before he as an  
individual could practice it. This line of thought has led to the dictum, ―It is easier to  
change group attitudes than individual attitudes.‖ Recent research lends some support to  
the view. In certain studies whole communities, whole housing projects, whole factories,  
or whole school systems have been made the target of change. By involving the leaders,  
the policies, the rank and file, new norms are created, and when this is accomplished, it is  
found that individual attitudes tend to conform to the new group norm (Allport, 1954  
p.40). 
 
Finally, this research highlights the importance of subtle social influence. Exposure to 
how social groups are treated or depicted in the media may shape implicit normative evaluations 
towards the groups. These normative evaluations have a powerful impact on behaviour without 
conscious effort. Like Allport’s observation, exposure to other people’s subtle expressions or 
normative evaluations can lead to discriminatory behaviour. By understanding the mechanism 











Appendix A: Stimulus items for implicit measures 
Study 1a  Stimulus items Flower items Insect items 
 party daisy ant 
 smile tulip yellow jacket 
 friend carnation housefly 
 joy lily maggot 
 happy rose cockroach 
 sunshine   
 love   
 gift   
 holiday   
 warmth   
 disease   
 abuse   
 garbage   
 death   
 agony   
 pain   
 evil   
 vomit   







Study 1b Stimulus items Apple items Candy bar items 
 Same items in Study 1a Granny Smith Caramilk 
  Red Delicious Twix 
  Winesap apples KitKat 
  Gala apples Reese 
  Golden Delicious Oh Henry! 
 
Study 2 Stimulus items Young items Old items 
 sadness Four faces of young 
men and women (two 
for each) 
Four faces of old men 
and women (two for 
each) 
 hate   
 dishonesty   
 injustice   
 oppression   
 honesty   
 happiness   
 love   
 justice   
 freedom   
Study 3 and 4 used the same positive and negative words as in Study 1a and 1b. For Study 3, I  
used four photos of European-Canadian and Muslim people (two men and two women). For  
Study 4, I used a stapler, desk, fork and chair for the neutral object category label and photos of 




Appendix B: Perceptions of Bias in Merit Assessment Scale (Study 3) 
 
An important issue for organizations is the assessment of merit (or qualifications) in the 
workplace.  One concern is whether criteria such as an individual’s skills, abilities, and 
knowledge are accurately assessed in both personnel selection and performance evaluation.  We 
are interested in the extent to which individuals believe that biases against visible minorities 
currently exist and/or historically existed (a) in the criteria chosen for selection and performance 
evaluation and (b) in the measurement of those criteria in organizations.  Please note:  We are 
referring to both intentional and unintentional biases that currently exist or historically existed in 
general within organizations. 
Please circle the number from 1 to 7 indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements. 
 
1. Historically, subtle personal biases of job interviewers disadvantaged visible minorities job 
applicants in the assessment of their qualifications. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
 
2. In the past, visible minorities were unfairly disadvantaged during performance evaluations 
because white managers often, consciously and/or unconsciously, exhibited in-group 
favoritism in the assessment of employees’ qualifications. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
 
3. In the past, white interviewers sometimes used different criteria for different ethnic groups 
during the selection process, disadvantaging visible minorities.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
4. In the past, visible minorities’ performance and potential were underestimated in the 
workplace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
5. Historically, the ability of visible minority employees was accurately reflected in their 
salaries.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 58 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
6. Historically, in both personnel selection and performance evaluation, there were no biases 
against visible minorities in the assessment of their competence. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
7. In the past, visible minorities received bonuses based on a fair evaluation of their work. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
8. In the past, visible minorities’ ability has been assessed fairly by managers when making 
promotion decisions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
9.  Historically, visible minority workers’ skills have been underestimated, biasing who was 
selected for important work assignments.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
10. Historically, deserving visible minorities were not disadvantaged in their opportunities to be 
selected for upper-level management positions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
11.  In the past, bias existed against visible minorities in the selection tests used to evaluate their 
skills and abilities. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 





12.  Currently, visible minorities are not disadvantaged in performance evaluations because of 
managers’ personal biases against visible minority employees. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
13.  Currently, selection systems recognize the full potential of visible minority candidates 
because cultural diversity, language skills, and different perspectives are appropriately valued by 
organizations. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
14.  Currently, barriers against visible minorities exist in some tests used for personnel selection 
(e.g., intelligence tests) because the tests are inherently biased in favor of groups who are 
familiar with North American cultural norms. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
15. Currently, in personnel selection, there is little bias against visible minorities in the 
assessment of their abilities. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
 
16. Currently, bias exists against visible minorities in the process of assessing skill-level and 
ability, unfairly disadvantaging visible minorities when salaries and bonuses are determined. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
17. Currently, regardless of personal intentions, personal prejudices against visible minority 
workers influence perceptions of their performance, unfairly disadvantaging them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 60 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
18.  Currently, when selecting employees for promotions and special assignments, visible 
minorities are evaluated in a fair manner that does not disadvantage them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
19. Currently, managers do not provide equal opportunities for visible minority employees to 
work on special assignments, as bias exists in the evaluations of their qualifications. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
20. Currently, when managers decide which employees deserve bonuses and benefits, visible 
minority are not discriminated against. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
21.  Currently, visible minorities earn salaries that are less than they deserve on the basis of their 
abilities and effort on the job. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
22.  Currently, visible minorities are not disadvantaged when their work performance is assessed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither 
Disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 







Appendix C: Budget Reduction Exercise (Study 3) 
Federation of Students’ Survey on Campus Club Funding 
 
 As you are probably aware, the Federation of Students subsidizes academic and social 
clubs on campus.  Unfortunately, given the current financial climate, the Federation of Students 
has recently announced that they will be forced to cut the amount of money that is allocated to 
academic and social clubs by 20%.  At the present time, we have been asked by the Federation of 
Students to assist them in assessing how undergraduates enrolled in psychology classes would 
allocate funds.  We would like your opinion on which clubs you feel should have their funding 
increased, decreased, or left at the same level.  Listed on the ballot accompanying this letter is a 
small subset of the clubs that receive funding from the Federation of Students.  Listed beside the 
name of each club is the current amount of funding they receive.  For instance, the UW Field 
Naturalist Club receives $275 from the Federation of Students.  In addition, you will see that 
the subset of clubs listed below received a total of $5000 this year.  Thus, next year, given cuts of 
20%, these clubs will probably receive only $4000 combined.  By completing the ballot on the 
following page, we would like you to provide your vote as to the amount of funding each of 
these groups should receive next year.  That is, we want you to list the amount of money you 
would like each of the groups listed below to receive.  When doing this, remember that your total 
should not exceed $4000.  When you have completed this anonymous ballot, your vote will be 
sent to the Federation of Students to aid in their decision making concerning any budget increase, 
reduction or no change at all.  Thank you for taking the time to complete this short survey. 
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Club 2007-2008 2008-2009 
 
 
-  Swing and Dance Social Club $675  
-  UW Field Naturalist Club $275  
-  Athletes in Action $625  





-  Waterloo Christian Fellowship  $350  
-  Muslim Students’ Association $575  
-  UW Pre-Optometry Club $700  
- Orthodox Christina Fellowship $525  
-  Engineers Without Borders $475  
-  Debating Society $325  
   

















Appendix D: Old Fashion Racism Scale (Study 4) 
Please indicate your reaction to each of the statements by selecting the number corresponding 
with your opinion. There are no correct answers so please respond as accurately as possible. 
 
 
1)  Most whites fear that blacks will bring violence to neighbourhoods when they move in. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
2) If a black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from him or 
her. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
3) I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
4) I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public place. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
5) I would not mind it at all if a black family with about the same income and education as me 
moved in next door. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
6) I think that black people look more similar to each other than white people do. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
8) I get very upset when I hear a white make a prejudicial remark about blacks. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
9) It would not bother me if my new roommate was black. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
10) It is likely that blacks will bring violence to neighbourhoods when they move in. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
11) I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
12) The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices blacks suffer at 
the hands of local authorities. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
13) Black and white people are inherently equal. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
14) I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a promotion 
because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 





15) Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both whites and 
blacks. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Neutral     Strongly 
agree 
 
16) Some blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 





















Appendix E: Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale (Study 4) 
 
This questionnaire is part of an investigation of people’s general opinions concerning a variety of 
social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and you 
disagree with others, to varying degrees. Please indicate your reaction to each of the statements 
by selecting the number corresponding with your opinion using the following scale. There are no 
correct answers so please respond as accurately as possible. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
disagree 




1. ____In today's society it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any 
manner.  
 
2. ____ I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how controversial they 
might be. 
 
3. ____I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered 
prejudiced. 
 
4. ____ If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an 
opinion with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint. 
 
5. ____ Going through life worrying about whether you might offend someone is just more 
trouble than it's worth. 
 
6. ____ It's important to me that other people not think I'm prejudiced. 
 
7. ____ I feel it's important to behave according to society's standards.  
 
8. ____ I'm careful not to offend my friends, but I don't worry about offending people I 
don't know or don't like.  
 
9. ____ I think that it's important to speak one's mind rather than to worry about offending 
someone.  
 
10. ____ It's never acceptable to express one's prejudices. 
 
11. ____ I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person.  
         
12. ____ When speaking to a Black person, it's important to me that he/she does not think I'm 
prejudiced.  
          
 
 67 
13. ____ It bothers me a great deal when I think I've offended someone, so I'm always careful 
to consider other people's feelings.  
 
14. ____ If I have a prejudiced thought or feeling, I keep it to myself.  
          
15. ____ I would never tell jokes that might offend others.  
        
16. ____ I'm not afraid to tell others what I think, even when I know they disagree with me. 
 
17. ____If someone who made me uncomfortable sat next to me on a bus, I would not 
hesitate to move to another seat.  
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